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Abstract
This paper evaluates the Korea National Pension (KNP) and investigates its redistribution
eﬀects. The educational level is used as a proxy for mortality and various socioeconomic
factors are considered. The ﬁnancial and utility-based analyses reveal strong progressive
redistribution with income level. Also, the utility-based analysis indicates signiﬁcant pro-
gressive redistribution with non-pension asset level but no signiﬁcant redistribution with the
educational level. Generally, the KNP is extremely valuable and its value seems higher with a
pre-existing private annuity especially for the poor. Finally, when people are assumed to spend
at least the minimum consumption level, it becomes more beneﬁcial.
Keywords: Korea National Pension; redistribution; annuity evaluation; annuity equivalent
wealth; moneyʼs worth ratio; bequest
JEL Classiﬁcation: C61, D91, J26, I38
I. Introduction
The national pension was introduced in Korea in 1988. Since then, it has experienced
phenomenal growth and is recognized as one of the four largest public pension funds in the
world (www.nps.or.kr). Currently, nearly 40% of the nationʼs total population is insured under
the KNP scheme, and it has ﬁrmly settled as the prime social welfare system for the aged and
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38.5% of baby boomers born between 1955 and 1963 have the KNP as the sole source of their
retirement income (www.kostat.go.kr). It is scarcely known outside Korea that the speed of
aging in Korea is actually the fastest among Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) member-countries even exceeding that of Japan. According to the
KOSTAT, the percentage of the population that is over 65 years of age was 7.2% in 2000 and
is expected to rise to 15.1% in 2020. This rapidly aging population induces an increase in the
longevity risk, i.e., the risk of outliving oneʼs resources (MacMinn et al. 2006; Stallard 2006).
Hence, the KNP is a critical source of protection for Korean retirees against the longevity risk,
and also it is a social security system with income redistribution eﬀects through its progressive
beneﬁt formula.
Many studies have established the progressive redistribution eﬀect of the KNP. However,
some recent studies (e.g., Lee, 2006; Chung and Lee, 2008) that reﬂect heterogeneity in
mortality have shown that the progressive redistribution is reduced or even that the regressive
redistribution is manifested. However, most previous studies have investigated the redistribution
eﬀect of the KNP based on ﬁnancial measurements such as ʻbeneﬁt/tax ratioʼ (e.g., Chung and
Lee, 2008; Kim, 2004; Lee, 2006) and have ignored the insurance value of the KNP. In other
words, they have not included the utility value of longevity insurance in their annuity valuation
framework. Meanwhile, a large body of the US-based literature (e.g., Brown, 2001; Mitchell et
al., 1999) has focused on measuring the insurance value of annuitization only for representative
groups without bequest options. The eﬀect of the bequest motive on the annuitization of wealth
is somewhat controversial. For instance, some studies argue that it is not quite signiﬁcant
(Brown, 2001; Hamermesh, 1984; Hurd, 1987; King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982), while others
suggest that the motive have a signiﬁcant impact on the value of annuitization (Bernheim,
1991; Davidoﬀ et al., 2005; Warshawsky, 1988). However, the bequest motive is found to be
an important factor that aﬀects utility levels for elderly Koreans (Chung, 2002). Moreover,
since the intergenerational relationship between children and their parents in Korea is more
normative and obligatory than that in other western countries including US, Koreans tend to
have strong bequest motives (Cho, 2003; Shin et al., 1997; Song, 2009). Therefore,
incorporation of the bequest motive in the annuity valuation framework should be useful and
valuable forthe Kor ean population and forotherpeoples that possess similarchar acter istics.
This study assesses the redistribution eﬀect of the KNP with the rigorous framework that
reﬂects realities of Korean life. First, this study evaluates the value of the KNP for retired
couples in the framework that incorporates the utility value of longevity insurance and various
levels of intensity of couplesʼ bequest motives. Second, we analyze the redistribution eﬀect of
the KNP by examining the pension value across various socioeconomic groups including the
educational level, income, assets, pre-existing private annuities, and risk when the bequest
motive is included in the valuation model. While analyzing, we use the educational level as a
proxy for mortality in order to classify the population. We use a life cycle-based optimization
model, and utilize the dynamic programming (DP) technique as a solution procedure to measure
the utility value of an annuity. In particular, by incorporating the bequest motive of couples,
this study extends and upgrades the previous annuity valuation model called the annuity
equivalent wealth (AEW) that was developed by Brown (2001) and Brown and Poterba (2000).
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1. Valuation of National Pension
The KNP is a life annuity and provides some protection to retirees against the risk of
outliving their accumulated assets. The insurance value of pensions has been considered in
several pension valuation studies regarding some developed countries including the US (e.g.,
Brown, 2003; Gong and Webb, 2008) and Switzerland (e.g., Butler and Teppa, 2007). Hence, it
should be included in the valuation framework of the KNP.
The valuation of annuities has been one of the main issues in the study of annuities, and
several attempts have been made to evaluate annuities based purely on ﬁnancial measurements.
For instance, many actuarial and insurance papers use the internal rate of return (IRR) types of
concepts to evaluate annuities and other forms of life insurance (i.e., Broverman, 1986).
Similarly, Mielvsky (2005) suggests a measure called implied longevity yield (ILY), which is
equal to the IRR overa ﬁxed deferral period that an individual would have to earn on their
investable wealth if she decides to self-annuitize using a systematic withdrawal plan. Another
commonly used ﬁnancial measurement for measuring the value of an annuity is the moneyʼs
worth ratio (MWR), which is deﬁned as the ratio of the expected net present value of all the
payouts to the premium paid for the annuity (Brown, 2007; Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988,
1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; Warshawsky, 1988).
However, a purely ﬁnancial measurement ignores the insurance value that individuals
derive from the elimination of longevity risk; hence, in order to assess the welfare eﬀect of
diﬀerential mortality, one must include heterogeneous mortality into a utility-based model
(Brown 2003). To overcome the limitation posed by purely ﬁnancial measurement, several
studies use a utility-based optimization model with the framework of a life-cycle model of
consumption to measure the value of annuities. In this type of model, the valuation of annuities
is usually attempted under varying conditions of the risk aversion, group-speciﬁc mortality rate,
time preference rate, and pre-existing annuity. Most of the previous studies that consider a
utility-based optimization model use numerical optimization techniques to calculate either the
wealth equivalent of an annuity or the AEW (Gong and Webb, 2008). Brown and Poterba
(2000) examine joint-life annuity products for married couples and analyze the potential utility
that an actuar ially fairannuity can pr ovide forcouples. Theirr esults indicate that forany given
level of risk aversion, married couples will place a lower valuation than single individuals on
annuitization. They also point out the importance of such analysis because most potential
buyers are married.
Abel and Warshawsky (1988), Bernheim (1991), and Davidoﬀ et al. (2005) claim that the
bequest motive may be one of the reasons for the annuity puzzle; that is, the bequest motive
has a negative impact on the valuation of annuities. Cocco et al. (2005) point out that the
introduction of a bequest motive has a relatively stronger eﬀect after retirement than before
retirement. Also, Brown and Poterba (2000) notice the importance of calibrating the eﬀect of
bequest motives on the demand forjoint-and-sur vivorannuities. They expect that annuities will
be less valuable if couples value wealth that is left to their heirs. Brown (2003) suggests that
even though the economics profession does not have a consensus about the importance of
bequests or how to model them, a study that furthers an understanding of the value of annuities
THE VALUATION AND REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF THE KOREA NATIONAL PENSION 2011] 115with bequest options will be useful.
Some studies speciﬁcally deal with the importance of the bequest motive in the Korean
population. While Chung (2002) notes that traditional life cycle models generally do not
include the bequest motive, she develops two separate life cycle models for the pre-retirement
and post-retirement periods, respectively. By analyzing a survey of 324 Korean retirees through
the models, she concludes that the bequest motive is one of the signiﬁcant factors that
determine the utility level of individuals. Also, Song (2009) analyzes the 2004 Korea National
Survey of the Actual Conditions and Welfare Demand of the Elderly and provides evidence that
88.5% of Korean retirees over 60 years of age want to save more money in order to receive
better care from their descendents. She argues that the holding of bequeathable wealth implies
the expectation of better attitudes on the part of descendents towards their parents and also that
the Korean elderly possess the exchange (or strategic) bequest motives that were suggested by
Bernheim et al. (1985). Song (2009) also examines the 2005 Korea National Panel Survey of
Security for the Aged and argues that when a family has one additional child, the possibility of
buying a private lifetime annuity decreases by 1.1%, which basically shows the existence of
somewhat strong bequest motives among the Korean people. Also, many Korean parents want
to leave theirhouse fortheirheir s as inher itance orhelp theirchildr en buy a house (Nam 2006;
Yoon 2005). We may conclude from previous studies that due to the strong inﬂuence of
tradition, Koreans have a strong tendency to save money to bequeath it to their children and in
exchange, expect care-giving from their children.
Few studies have speciﬁcally dealt with the utility-based valuation of annuities forthe
Korean population. Yuh and Yang (2009) use the AEW to measure the value of life-time
annuities forthe Kor ean population. Theirr esults indicate that the value of a life-time annuity
is high regardless of the gender and degree of risk aversion, and decreases as the level of pre-
existing annuities increases. However, they do not use cohort-speciﬁc life tables, and their
analysis is conﬁned to single individuals without bequest motives.
2. The Distributional Eﬀects of National Pension
There is considerable literature that evaluates the distributional eﬀects of the US social
security system in purely ﬁnancial terms (e.g., Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass, 2000; Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2001; Liebman, 2002). They all ﬁnd that mandatory annuitization reduces the
overall progressivity of the system since households with high lifetime incomes tend to live
longer. In other words, mandatory annuitization such as social security and most deﬁned beneﬁt
pensions redistributes wealth from those who die young and are disproportionately male and/or
less well educated toward those with low mortality and who are disproportionately female
and/orcollege educated (Gong and Webb, 2008).
Brown (2003) is the ﬁrst to extend the analysis of the AEW to explain the redistribution
eﬀects of wealth due to so-called mandatory annuitization such as Social Security. He ﬁnds that
the degree of the redistribution that arises from a mandatory annuity program is substantially
loweron a utility-adjusted basis than when evaluated on pur ely ﬁnancial terms, such as the
MWR of an actuarially fair annuity. Speciﬁcally, he shows that quite a large redistribution
exists when measured on a ﬁnancial basis and often is away from economically disadvantaged
groups and toward groups that are better oﬀ ﬁnancially. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that farless
redistribution appears to exist when evaluating on a utility-adjusted basis. Recently, Gong and
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distribution eﬀect of wealth, by including married couples and pre-existing annuities. Using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data and considering longevity risk-pooling within
marriages and pre-existing annuity wealth, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant redistribution away from
disadvantaged groups in expected-utility terms: a signiﬁcant minority will perceive themselves
as suﬀering a loss from mandatory annuitization.
There are some Korean studies which estimate the distributional consequences of
mandatory annuitization in expected utility terms, but almost all studies deal with them using
purely ﬁnancial measurements such as beneﬁt/tax ratio. Most studies using the ﬁnancial
measurements conﬁrm that in the KNP system, redistribution appears to exist across income
groups showing that the ﬁnancial measurements decreases as the income level increases (e.g.,
Kwon, 2005; Seok and Kim, 2002; Tchoi, 1999). Forinstance, Tchoi (1999) examines the
redistribution eﬀect of the national pension across diﬀerent income groups, and estimates 5.06,
2.32, and 1.63 for low income, middle income, and high income groups respectively. In the
meantime, Lee (2006) investigates the distributional eﬀects of the national pension considering
mortality diﬀerences by income and generation, and ﬁnds that heterogeneous mortality
moderately reduces the redistributive eﬀects of the national pension system. However, Lee
(2006) also uses a ﬁnancial measurement which is the beneﬁt/tax ratio to measure the value of
the KNP. Very recently, Yang et al. (2010) study the KNP with single individuals without
considering the bequest motives and ﬁnd that the regressive redistribution is somewhat small
under a utility-based measurement. Further, Lee (2006) and Yang et al. (2010) are limited to
the case of single individuals instead of couples and do not considerthe bequest motivation.
III. Methodology
We begin by describing the KNP payouts to individuals depending upon their marital
status. Then, we discuss the cohort-speciﬁc life table that we apply to evaluate the ﬁnancial and
utility value of the KNP. Also, we introduce the MWR, which is a commonly used
measurement to ﬁnancially evaluate the KNP and illustrate our life-cycle model, which has the
objectives of maximizing the utility from consumption and bequests. We then introduce a
method to calculate the AEW of the KNP forcouples in Kor ea. The AEW analysis that we use
is similar to those in Brown (2001; 2003), Brown and Poterba (2000), Gong and Web (2008),
Yang et al. (2010), and Yuh and Yang (2009). However, we extend the previous models by
considering couples instead of singles and including the bequest motive of couples. All the
monetary values in the model are converted to USD using an exchange rate of USD 1 ＝ 1,000
KRW forsimplicity and ease of exposition
1.
1. The KNP Payouts
We assume that a forty-year-old Korean male who was born in 1970 is insured under the
KNP
2 and has a dependent wife. We also assume that he started contributing to the KNP when
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1 As of January 1, 2006, USD 1 = 1,013 KRW.
2 According to the KOSTAT, more than 78% of heads of households were males in Korea in 2006.he was thirty years old and did that for thirty years. The couple will start receiving pension
payouts when he is 65 years old
3. As long as both husband and wife are alive, the monthly
pension payout, At, which will be received by the couple is determined by the formula from the




















In Eq. (1), A is the average monthly income of all the insurers for the last three years and
B is a particular individualʼs average monthly income during his/her period of contribution.
Also, n represents the total number of additional periods in months after 20 years of
contributing to the KNP. Since we assume that the individual has contributed for thirty years,
the total numberof months of contr ibution is P=30-12=360 and so, n should be 120
months. Also, P1 denotes the total numberof months between year s 2000 and 2007, inclusive,
and is 8-12=96 months. Similarly, each of P2, P3,..., P21 represents the number of months
existing in years 2008, 2009,..., 2027, respectively, and they are all 12 months. Finally, P22
denotes the numberof months existing in year s 2028 and 2029, and is 2 -12=24 months.
Since we do not know the future value, A, forthe individual, we use A=1,750,959 KRW,
which is about 1,751 USD that the KNP uses in theirlatest example to illustr ate its policy for
the Korean public (www.nps.or.kr).
When a dependent dies, Eq. (1) changes slightly and becomes the same as Eq. (1) without
the last term, which is 214.86/12=17.905. When the primary benefactor dies, Eq. (1) changes



















2. Classiﬁcation of the Population and Life Table
1 Classiﬁcation of the population with diﬀerent mortality rates
This study classiﬁes the Korean population into four diﬀerent groups by the educational
level, viz., elementary school graduates, middle school graduates, high school graduates, and
college graduates. Further, we use the educational level as a proxy for mortality to classify the
population in Korea. The people who have a higher socioeconomic level are known to have a
lower mortality rate than the people with a lower socioeconomic level. Among various
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beneﬁt reception will increase and eventually correspond to age 65 in year 2033.socioeconomic variables, income level has been found to be a strong factor aﬀecting the
mortality rate in Korea as other countries (Jeong, 2009; Kang et al., 2004). More strictly
speaking, the level of lifetime ﬁnancial resources available to an individual is a more accurate
measure to use, but solid measures of lifetime resources are not always available. Thus, one
widely used measure is the current income of an individual or family, but this is found to be a
poor measure of lifetime resources (Brown, 2003; Lee, 2006). A better alternative to the current
income seems to be educational attainment, simply education which is a reasonable proxy for
lifetime resources because more highly educated individuals have, on average, higher lifetime
incomes (Brown, 2003; Son, 2004; Liebman, 1999; Lee, 2006; Kang et al., 2008). In addition,
education is a predetermined variable for most retired individuals.
A signiﬁcant negative correlation between education and mortality has been well
documented in literature (Deaton and Paxon, 2001; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Lantz et al.,
1998). Further, the association of education with mortality seems somewhat stronger in Korea
than in more developed countries like UK and US (Son, 2004). Speciﬁcally, some studies
suggest that higher mortality rates relate to a lower educational level for most causes of death,
and that mortality ratios for elementary versus university education were 5.11 for men, and 3.42
for women in Korea (e.g., Kang et al., 2004; Son, 2004). These factors are the primary
motivation forusing the educational level as a measur e of economic status in this study.
2 Cohort-speciﬁc life table
We calculate cohort-speciﬁc mortality rates for people who were born in 1970. Also, for
the same population, we calculate group-speciﬁc cohort mortality rates for groups that are
diﬀerentiated by gender and educational level.
In order to obtain the AEW, it is critical to use a cohort-speciﬁc life table instead of a
regular life table for a certain year. Since it was impossible to obtain raw cohort mortality rate
data forage-speci ﬁc groups in Korea, we used past population census data and the future
population data of the target cohort from the KOSTAT to estimate the cohort-speciﬁc mortality
rates. Fortunately, the data were available for age-speciﬁc cohorts and thus, we could estimate
mortality rates for the target cohort. Further, some more estimation of mortality rates was
necessary due to the absence of the estimated age-speciﬁc population data afterthe year , 2050
4.
After we obtain the mortality rates for men and women in the target cohort, we smooth the
data by using a nonlinearmodel forthe age-speci ﬁc mortality rates regarding each group. As
suggested in Brown et al. (2002), we apply the Gompertz-Makeham survival function to obtain
ﬁtted estimates for the mortality rates for a particular group regarding a speciﬁc age. The three
parameters used in the Gompertz-Makeham survival function are estimated by using nonlinear
least squares regression. This approach guarantees that the ﬁtted mortality rates are monotonic
functions of the age.
With the ﬁtted mortality rates for particular groups, we construct group-speciﬁc cohort
mortality rates by using the method in Brown et al. (2002). To justify the method, Brown et al.
(2002) made two assumptions. First, the ratio of a groupʼs age-speciﬁc mortality to that of the
population as a whole is an accurate portrayal of the ratio in the entire population. Second,
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4 We used the estimation method that is used by the KOSTAT. The KOSTAT assumes that qx=qx-1e
ax+b for
successive mortality rates after the age of 85, where a and b are estimated through regression. We use this method to
calculate the mortality rate after the year 2050.these ratios are constant over time. In this paper, we follow their method. For example,
q
cohort, colleage graduate
x, male , which is a cohort, group-speciﬁc mortality rate (corresponding to Korean male









qx, male  
where qx, male is the mortality rate of Korean men in the life table of 2005 and q
colleage graduate
x, male is the
mortality rate of Korean male college graduates in the life table of 2005
5 . Through this
approach, we calculate the group-speciﬁc cohort mortality rates for elementary-school
graduates, middle-school graduates, high-school graduates, and college graduates for both men
and women.
We included our estimated mortality rates by education and gender in Table 1. To see the
pattern of the data more clearly, we also included the graph which depicts changes of mortality
rates by education and ages for Korean male (Figure 1). The graph shows diﬀerent patterns of
mortality rates according to ages by education. We intentionally excluded ages more than 85 in
order to see the diﬀerent patterns more clearly.
3. Financial Measurement: MWR
By using the annual contribution to the KNP, Eqs. (1) and (2), and mortality rates
6,w e
calculate the MWR, which is a commonly-used ﬁnancial measurement to evaluate the annuity
(Brown, 2007). In this paper, we use the MWR to ﬁnancially evaluate the KNP. To calculate
the MWR, we ﬁrst calculate the net present value (NPV) of the total contribution to the KNP
and the NPV of the total pension payout. Then, the MWR can be simply deﬁned as follows:
MWR =
Expected NPV of total pension payout
NPV of total contribution to KNP .
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5 These data are either obtained or purchased from the KOSTAT. They show the number of people with a speciﬁc
educational background who died during the year 2005.


















Male Female Elementary Middle High College Elementary Middle High College
Male
0.0141 0.0079 0.0034 0.0024 0.0051 0.0023 0.0011 0.0008
0.0033 0.0010 0.0170 0.0088 0.0037
TABLE 1. MORTALITY RATES BY GENDER AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
0.0021 0.0060
0.0021 0.0012 0.0010
0.0044 0.0013 0.0121 0.0075 0.0035 0.0029 0.0042 0.0021 0.0011 0.0008
0.0037 0.0011
0.0022 0.0118 0.0094 0.0056 0.0054 0.0036 0.0025 0.0016 0.0014
0.0056 0.0016 0.0113 0.0079 0.0041 0.0038 0.0037
0.0139 0.0067 0.0062 0.0048 0.0041
0.0114 0.0036 0.0141 0.0126 0.0085 0.0084 0.0044 0.0036 0.0026 0.0022
0.0077
0.0171
0.0289 0.0124 0.0285 0.0294 0.0257 0.0238 0.0121 0.0120 0.0099 0.0082
0.0178 0.0064 0.0190 0.0186 0.0144
0.0822 0.0888 0.0741 0.0514 0.0521 0.0470 0.0365
0.0480 0.0248 0.0458 0.0487 0.0475 0.0418 0.0242 0.0247 0.0214
0.2242 0.2169 0.1631
0.1352 0.1018 0.1316 0.1393 0.1639 0.1308 0.1101 0.1099 0.1028 0.0779
0.0807 0.0503 0.0769
0.2230 0.2010 0.2235 0.2328 0.2906 0.2259 0.2292Note that the numerator is the sum of all future pension payments, weighted by the
probability that an individual will be alive to receive them and discounted back to the present
(or the time of retirement) under a risk-free interest rate. Similarly, the denominator is the sum
of all contributions to the KNP and discounted to the present (or the time of retirement) under a
risk-free interest rate. If the MWR is less than 1.0, then we may say that an individual or
couple who are insured by the KNP on average will receive less in pension payments than they
contributed in premiums.
4. Utility-based Measurement: AEW
We introduce a multi-period optimization model to calculate the AEW. Originally, the
AEW is the amount of wealth that an individual (orcouple) would need in the absence of an
actuarially fair annuity market in order to achieve the same utility level that s/he (resp., they)
earns when such markets are available (Brown and Poterba, 2000). In this paper, we measure
the AEW forthe KNP instead of an actuar ially fairannuity. We assume that a couple has a
non-annuitized net wealth W0 and the KNP at the time of retirement. We also assume that they
may or may not have pre-existing annuities. In order to include the situation where an
individual can bequeath to his/herdescendants upon death, we modify the consumption-based
utility function in the optimization model. Forsimplicity, we assume that the utility function
that is applied forthe bequest is identical to the utility function that is applied forthe investor ʼs
own consumption when alive, as in Cocco et al. (2005). Further, to make the model more
realistic, we add one other constraint regarding the minimum annual consumption. Also, we
assume that all the monetary values in the model are in real terms
7.
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7 Fora descr iption of the optimization model, see Appendix A.



























All Elementary Middle High College
40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 851 Solution procedure: DP
Generally, it is diﬃcult to obtain a closed-form solution for AEW (i.e., a)in a multi-
period setting with liquidity constraints that are imposed by the annuity structure. In such cases,
one way to solve for a is to use the DP techniques; we use the DP to solve for the optimal
consumption path and bequest amount
8 . To apply the DP technique, we use a recursively
deﬁned value function Vt (Wt)where Wt denotes the non-pension assets at time t
9.
2 Calculation of the AEW
We assume that a couple has a non-pension wealth of W1 at the time of retirement. Also,
we assume that the NPV (at the time of retirement)of the total contribution to the KNP is W2.
For notational convenience, we let W
＊=W1+W2. If the couple is not insured by the KNP, then
W0=W
＊ and At=0 for t=0, 1,..., T,age+1 where age is the retirement age.
To calculate a,w eﬁrst ﬁnd the maximum utility, V
＊, for the case where the couple has
the KNP and W0=W1. Then, we solve for the case where the KNP is not available. In other
words, we solve the same optimization problem with the constraints, At=0 for t=0, 1,...,
T,age+1. Then, we solve for the additional wealth, bW, which is required for the couple in
addition to W
＊ in order to achieve the utility value, V





In order to obtain bW, we also use the DP repeatedly by applying a series of bW ʼs.






3 Pre-existing private annuity
A couple may already have wealth in the form of a life annuity that is paid out to the
couple or surviving individual during the retirement period. If the household receives this type
of income from a pre-existing annuity such as a private annuity payout, then W1 should be
modiﬁed to consider the total value of the pre-existing annuity. In this case, we calculate the
NPV of the pre-existing annuity by summing up all the payouts from the annuity discounted by
the real interest rate and probability of survival. Brown and Poterba (2000)call this the








where At is the annuity payout from the pre-existing annuity and Pt is the probability of
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8 In this paper, we develop a computer code by using the programming language, C, to solve the problem. The
program is run on a PC with an Intel® Xeon® CPU E5504, a clock-speed of 2 GHz, and 2.99 GB RAM.
9 For detailed descriptions of the value functions and the DP procedure, see Appendix B.survival. Then, we subtract the EPDV from W1 when the household has a pre-existing annuity.
For the analysis, we assume that the household may hold a certain percentage of W1 as the pre-
existing annuity. In this case, the constraints, (A-4), in the optimization model should be
changed as follows:
Wt+1=(Wt,Ct+At+At)(1+r), for t=0, 1,..., T,age+1.
For simplicity, we assume that pre-existing private annuity is paid out to couples when they are
65 years old which is the same age when the KNP starts paying out their ﬁrst pension payment
to the couples.
5. Assumptions and Parameters
In this section, we discuss the assumptions and parameters used in this study.
1 Target cohort and retirement age
Couples with four diﬀerent educational levels are considered
10. Speciﬁcally, the cohort we
analyze is forty-year-old in 2005 and varies by educational level (elementary school, middle
school, high school, and college). For simplicity, we assume that the ages of the husband and
wife are identical
11 and they have the same educational level
12. The retirement age is set to 65
because for this cohort, the KNP is supposed to pay out the ﬁrst pension payment when they
are 65 years old.
2 Life tables
We use the group-speciﬁc cohort mortality rates for elementary school graduates, middle
school graduates, high school graduates, and college graduates for both men and women. See
Table 1 for estimated mortality rates used in the paper.
3 CRRA (constant relative risk aversion, b)
We utilize b=1 to represent the case of low risk-aversion and b=3 to represent the case
of high risk-aversion. The case of b=2 can be considered an intermediate case between the
two extremes.
4 Non-pension assets, pre-existing private annuities, and minimum consumption
We analyze the AEW results under various values of the pre-existing annuity ratio, i.e., the
proportion of pre-existing annuity assets relative to the total net wealth at the time of
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10 According to KOSTAT, for those people who are between 60 and 69 years old, around 70% of their households
have married couples in 2005.
11 According to KOSTAT census data between years 2006 and 2009, the same age marriage was the most popular
with slight margin. During this period, couples with the same age comprise about 16%. Also, couples with 1~2 year
diﬀerence (husband is older)comprise about 26 % and couples with 3~5 year diﬀerence (husband is older)comprise
about 28%.
12 According to the 2000 Korea census, about 69% of the couples belong to the cohort born in the 1970s have the
same educational level. Speciﬁcally, 36.73% of couples have high school diplomas, 31.17% have college degrees,
0.73% have middle school diplomas, and 0.16% have elementary school diplomas as their same and ﬁnal educational
level. (Lee, 2010).retirement: 0%,2 5 %, and 50%
13. We consider three diﬀerent levels of the net wealth for the
age of 65, viz., $73,000 (25th percentile), $163,000 (50th percentile), and $331,000 (75th
percentile). The data are based on Korean household data in 2006 from the KOSTAT. Also, the
minimum annual consumption level is set to $8,000
14.
5 Contribution to the KNP and pension payouts
As mentioned earlier, we assume that a Korean male started contributing to the KNP at
thirty years of age and did that for thirty years. For simplicity, we assume that he earns an
identical income in real terms throughout his thirty years of employment
15. We consider ﬁve
diﬀerent income levels, and they are 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles in terms of the
real income in 2006 from the KOSTAT. Pension payouts for each income level are calculated
by using Eqs. (1)and (2) ; they are summarized in Table 2.
6 Interest rate, inﬂation rate, insurance transactions fee, and other parameters
This study follows the assumptions used in Brown (2003). We assume that the real interest
rate, r, is 0.03 and the annual inﬂation rate, p, is 0.00
16. In accordance with the value used in
Brown (2003), we established the utility discount rate, r, as being 3%; further, the time
preference is set to 3%. The parameter, b, controls the intensity of the bequest motive; diﬀerent
values for b ranging from 0 to 5 are considered. Also, the fraction of pension payment that will
be paid to the survivor after the death of one member of the couple is determined in Eq. (2);
for pre-existing private annuities, this number is set to 0.67 as in Brown and Poterba (2000).
Also, regarding the pre-existing private annuity, we assume that the annuity is priced at an
actuarially fair rate using uniform pricing. Also, following Brown and Poterbaʼs (2000)
assumptions, the degree of jointness, l, and the relative weights of the husbandʼs and wifeʼs
utilities in the household utility aggregate, j, are set to 0 and 1, respectively. The survivor ratio
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13 For instance, the pre-existing annuity ratio is set to 50% in Brown and Poterba (2000).
14 According to the Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family Aﬀairs (MIHWAF)in Korea, the actual minimum
standard costs of living for two-person and one-person households were approximately $8,400 and $5,000, respectively
in 2006.
15 This assumption may look too simple. However, the main purpose of this assumption is not to model the life cycle
of an individual but to classify the population according to income level. Further, the simulation runs only for the
retirement period.
16 This value is reasonable because the average rate of the 10-year Korea Treasury Bond (KTB)was 5.87 % and the
average annual growth rate in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)from 2000 to 2006 was 3.04 %.
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TABLE 2. MONTHLY INCOME,C ONTRIBUTION TO THE KNP,
AND PENSION PAYOUT (UNIT: USD)
10%f is not an important concern for our model because the KNP speciﬁcally provide how annuity
is changed after a partner is passed away. Hence, only pre-existing private annuity needs to set
this value. For all cases, we ﬁx f as 0.7 but we will provide some sensitivity analysis in
Appendix C. Finally, the insurance transactions fee of a private annuity when annuitizing, M,i s
ﬁxed at 5%
17.
IV. Findings and Discussions
1. Financial Analysis
We ﬁrst calculate the MWR, and the results are presented in Table 3. The MWR values in
Table 2 generally indicate that the KNP is ﬁnancially valuable for people who are insured
under the KNP because the MWR values are all greater than unity except for one case.
Especially, the MWRs are extremely proﬁtable for people who earn small incomes. Further
ﬁnancial analysis shows that the KNP is favorable to couples that earn less income, and it also
reveals that couples with a higher educational level receive more beneﬁts from the KNP. The
ﬁrst result indicates a strong progressive redistribution through the KNP system, which is due
to the KNP payout formula that determines the amount of pension payout by combining an
individualʼs own income level and the average income level over all those insured by the KNP.
However, the second result indirectly implies that the progressive redistribution may be
signiﬁcantly reduced or even nulliﬁed if we opt in the educational level, which has strong
correlations with the mortality rate and the non-pension wealth level
18. For example, a couple
with the 30th percentile income level and elementary school education has 1.4231. However,
this value is smaller than 1.5637, which is for a couple with the 90th percentile income level
and high-school education. Finally, we can see that the reduction in the MWR is the greatest
between the 10th and 30th percentile income levels (Fig. 2). This ﬁgure also signiﬁes that the
MWRs are extremely valuable for people who earn very small incomes.
THE VALUATION AND REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF THE KOREA NATIONAL PENSION 2011] 125
17 The value of M is diﬃcult to determine since each insurance company uses its own method for this calculation.
We believe that 5% is about the average level in Korea.
18 It is quite surprising to see the magnitude of diﬀerence in the MWR by the educational level, and it is all due to
diﬀerences in the mortality rate during the retirement period.
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TABLE 3. THE MWR VALUES FOR VARIOUS INCOME PERCENTILES
AND EDUCATIONAL LEVELS
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FIG.3 . T HE AEW VALUES FOR THREE NON-PENSION ASSET LEVELS (1,000 USD)


















10 30 50 70 902. Utility-based Analysis
The values of the AEW of a couple in relation to the income level, which ranges from
10% to 90%, non-pension asset level, which includes the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values,
and the intensity level of the bequest motive, b, which ranges from 0 through to 5, are
presented in Table 4. In Table 4, it is assumed that the CRRA is 1 and no pre-existing private
annuity exists. A risk aversion of unity corresponds to log utility, a value that is often found to
be the average risk aversion in many studies of consumption (Laibson et al., 1998).
Generally, the KNP is worthwhile in terms of the utility because the AEW values are
greater than unity for all cases except when the income level is very high (90%). Without a
bequest motivation, the AEW decreases as the income increases for a ﬁxed non-pension asset
level (Fig. 3). This indicates a progressive redistribution by the income level. However, even
though it is diﬃcult to compare directly the eﬀects due to the inherent diﬀerences, we can
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1.0977 1.1578 1.2261 30
0.9658 0.9466 0.9274 90
1.0574
1.1142 50
1.0197 1.0234 1.0231 70
0.9690 0.9510 0.9325 90
TABLE 4. VARIATION OF THE AEW WITH THE INCOME PERCENTILE,B EQUEST
MOTIVATION LEVEL, AND NON-PENSION ASSET LEVEL
1.1807 1.3384
0.9388 90
1.1829 1.3426 1.6298 10
b＝4





1.0638 1.0919 1.1213 50
1.0237 1.0287 1.0298 70
0.9732 0.9563
1.0290 1.0359 1.0383 70
0.9786 0.9634 0.9468 90
1.1856 1.3474 1.6391 10
b＝3
1.1038
1.1893 1.3540 1.6505 10
b＝2
1.1085 1.1740 1.2496 30
1.0686 1.0986 1.1301 50
30
1.0757 1.1093 1.1434 50
1.0369 1.0462 1.0512 70
0.9866 0.9737 0.9587 90
1.0781 70
1.0045 0.9957 0.9836 90
1.1948 1.3642 1.6670 10
b＝1
1.1156 1.1841 1.2638
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FIG.4 . T HE AEW VALUES FOR SIX DIFFERENT INTENSITY LEVELS OF THE BEQUEST














b=0 b=1 b=2 b=3 b=4 b=5
10 30 50 70 90
FIG.5 . V ARIATION OF THE AEW WITH THE LEVELS OF NON-PENSION ASSETS
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1.0504 1.0605
50 1.0913 1.0903 1.0889 1.0881 1.0968
30 1.1314 1.1304 1.1291 1.1282 1.1364
331
1.1885 1.1875 1.1876 1.1951
90 1.0045 1.0029 1.0011 1.0004 1.0126





50 1.0686 1.0676 1.0660 1.0665 1.0770




90 0.9786 0.9774 0.9755 0.9764 0.9891
70 1.0290 1.0278 1.0261 1.0267 1.0387
1.2895 1.2900 1.3126
b＝0






TABLE 5. THE AEW VALUES FOR VARIOUS EDUCATIONAL LEVELS,I NCOMES,B EQUEST
INTENSITY LEVELS, AND LEVELS OF NON-PENSION ASSETS
1.0578 1.0591 1.0698
30 1.1002 1.0994 1.0980 1.0991 1.1094
b＝4
10 1.1829 1.1822 1.1811 1.1819
1.0756 1.0726 1.0737 1.0947




0.9690 0.9680 0.9661 0.9679 0.9809
70 1.0197 1.0188 1.0170 1.0185 1.0307
50 1.0602 1.0594
10 1.6505 1.6477 1.6436 1.6470 1.6757
90 0.9836 0.9812 0.9783 0.9794 1.0000
70 1.0781
College High School Middle School Elementary School All
90
1.0602
50 1.1301 1.1278 1.1244 1.1278 1.1523
30 1.2496 1.2472 1.2435 1.2470 1.2725
b＝2
1.6234 1.6280 1.6570
90 0.9468 0.9448 0.9415 0.9451 0.9680
70 1.0383 1.0361 1.0327 1.0363
1.1142 1.1123 1.1088 1.1137 1.1380
30 1.2324 1.2304 1.2267 1.2315 1.2571
b＝4
10 1.6298 1.6275
90 0.9325 0.9308 0.9275 0.9326 0.9609
70 1.0231 1.0212 1.0178 1.0228 1.0466
50
1.1286 1.1441
30 1.2066 1.2048 1.2027 1.2021 1.2169
b＝0
10 1.3864 1.3850 1.3833 1.3826 1.3942
0.9937 0.9914 0.9915 1.0084
70 1.0688 1.0668 1.0646 1.0644 1.0798
50 1.1332 1.1313 1.1290
30 1.1740 1.1724 1.1701 1.1713 1.1875
b＝2
10 1.3540 1.3524 1.3504 1.3513 1.3664
90 0.9957
0.9793
70 1.0359 1.0342 1.0317 1.0334 1.0511
50 1.0986 1.0971 1.0948 1.0961 1.1137
1.1584 1.1608 1.1771
b＝4
10 1.3426 1.3413 1.3391 1.3410 1.3561
90 0.9634 0.9617 0.9591 0.9612
1.0234 1.0220 1.0193 1.0224 1.0403
50 1.0870 1.0857 1.0833 1.0859 1.1024
30 1.1621 1.1607
b＝0
10 1.2081 1.2074 1.2064 1.2056 1.2115
90 0.9510 0.9496 0.9469 0.9502 0.9685
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1.1699 1.1278 1.1002 30
1.0942
90 0.9690
1.0408 1.0342 1.0290 70
0.9656 0.9735 0.9786 90
1.3570





1.1783 1.1359 1.1085 30
1.1032 1.0819 1.0686 50
73
1.0640 1.0578 1.0540 70





1.1990 1.1567 1.1314 30
1.1260 1.1037 1.0913 50
50
1.0251 1.0216 1.0234 70
0.9340 0.9424 0.9510 90
1.3846
1.5969 1.4358 1.3426 10
b＝4
1.2261 1.1857 1.1621 30
1.1135 1.0944 1.0870
1.1067 1.0986 50
1.0376 1.0344 1.0359 70
0.9465 0.9545 0.9634 90
90
1.6110 1.4483 1.3540 10
b＝2
1.2395 1.1976 1.1740 30
1.1263
1.1573 1.1396 1.1332 50
1.0681 1.0668 1.0688 70
0.9769 0.9849 0.9957
0.9228 0.9325 90
1.6465 1.4802 1.3864 10
b＝0
116
1.2717 1.2300 1.2066 30
30
1.1276 1.1179 1.1142 50
1.0199 1.0179 1.0231 70
0.9183
0.9327 0.9372 0.9468 90




1.1441 1.1338 1.1301 50
1.0348 1.0334 1.0383 70
70
0.9679 0.9733 0.9836 90
1.9876 1.7728 1.6505 10
b＝2
1.3064observe that the size of the eﬀect is much bigger with the MWRs than with the AEWs. With
regard to non-pension assets, the AEW decreases as the non-pension asset level increases for a
ﬁxed income level (Fig. 3). Consequently, there is a progressive redistribution by the non-
pension asset level. Note that we cannot consider factors such as the non-pension asset level
when we calculate the MWR. Regardless of the bequest intensity, the variation of the AEW
values with the diﬀerent non-pension asset levels diminishes as the income level increases, and
when the income percentile is 90 (for all cases) or 70 (for b=4 and higher), the AEW for the
smallest non-pension asset level is even slightly larger than in the other cases (Table 4). Under
a ﬁxed non-pension asset level, the reduction in the AEW is the greatest between the 10th and
30th percentile income levels and becomes smaller as the income increases (Fig. 5). Also, it is
seen that the bequest eﬀect is clear and consistent but its magnitude seems somewhat smaller
than that of the income and non-pension assets (Fig. 5).
The AEW values by the educational level, bequest motive, income, and non-pension assets
are presented in Table 5. Fig. 6 plots the AEW values when there is no bequest motive and the
level of non-pension assets is ﬁxed. Surprisingly, the AEW values do not show clear diﬀerences
in relation to the educational background except for slightly higher values for college graduates.
This result contrasts with that of the MWR, wherein the MWR values increase as the
educational level increases. From this observation, we may conclude that in terms of the utility
value, the regressive redistribution eﬀect is not as strong as that estimated through the ﬁnancial
measurement. Brown (2003) points out that regardless of a speciﬁc groupʼs mortality risk,
annuity provides much utility by eliminating the risk of running resources down to a very low
level in the event that one lives longer than expected. He also points out that even for high-
mortality-risk groups, avoidance of low consumptions at the later part of their life implies huge
utility gains. Therefore, quite large amount of utility gains are due to the role of annuity as
longevity insurance which helps not only the low-mortality-risk groups but also the high-
THE VALUATION AND REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF THE KOREA NATIONAL PENSION 2011] 131















b =0, Non-pension Asset=116
All Elementary Middle High College
10 30 50 70 90HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 132
1.1315 1.1089 1.0781























1.1469 1.1306 1.1002 30
1.1066
90 0.9690
1.0742 1.0584 1.0290 70
1.0281 1.0089 0.9786 90
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1.1487 1.1345 1.1085 30
1.1088 1.0942 1.0686 50
73
1.0823 1.0717 1.0540 70





1.1556 1.1462 1.1314 30
1.1174 1.1067 1.0913 50
50
1.0930 1.0689 1.0234 70
1.0232 0.9954 0.9510 90
1.2262
1.4064 1.3848 1.3426 10
b＝4
1.2321 1.2053 1.1621 30
1.1596 1.1329 1.0870
1.1393 1.0986 50
1.0958 1.0749 1.0359 70
1.0268 1.0014 0.9634 90
90
1.4094 1.3899 1.3540 10
b＝2
1.2351 1.2116 1.1740 30
1.1626
1.1750 1.1588 1.1332 50
1.1098 1.0929 1.0688 70
1.0416 1.0229 0.9957
0.9830 0.9325 90
1.4206 1.4064 1.3864 10
b＝0
116
1.2474 1.2312 1.2066 30
30
1.2031 1.1715 1.1142 50
1.1086 1.0777 1.0231 70
1.0129
1.0175 0.9898 0.9468 90




1.2079 1.1789 1.1301 50
1.1130 1.0848 1.0383 70
70
1.0365 1.0137 0.9836 90
1.7523 1.7140 1.6505 10
b＝2
1.3362mortality-risk groups. Therefore, quite large amount of utility gains are due to the role of
annuity as longevity insurance which helps not only the low-mortality-risk groups but also the
high-mortality-risk groups. This result is consistent with that in Brown (2003).
We analyze the variation in the AEW with the level of the pre-existing private annuity
(Table 6). The pre-existing private annuity is expressed as a percentage of the non-pension
assets. As the percentage of pre-existing private annuity increases, the AEW also increases. In
other words, a pre-existing annuity tends to improve the value of the KNP. These results are
somewhat opposite to previous ﬁndings in several other studies (e.g., Brown and Poterba, 2000;
Yuh and Yang, 2009). However, it seems that these results are due to the extremely high
ﬁnancial attractiveness of the KNP, especially when income level is low
19. Certainly, we can
ﬁnd ʻnormalʼ results when the income is very high, say at the 70th and 90th percentile levels
where the KNP is not as attractive as at the lower income level. In these cases, the AEW may
decrease slightly as the pre-existing annuity increases (Fig. 7). This result implies that
purchasing an additional private annuity instead of self-annuitization actually helps people in
lower incomes and non-pension asset classes improve their satisfaction in their retirement.
20
Fig. 7 plots the variation of the AEW with the levels of pre-existing private annuity and
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19 The similar results can be found in Yang et al. (2010).
20 We run a sensitivity analysis with diﬀerent utility discount rate. This extra result implies that more annuities
(private, corporate, and etc.) are preferred when people put relatively more value on the consumption in the future (i.e.,
low utility discount rate). However, if people earn more value from the present consumption and consumption in near
future (i.e., high utility discount rate), then they may not need extra annuities.
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b＝2non-pension assets when there is no bequest motive. It indicates that the eﬀect ofthe pre-
existing annuity is the greatest when the income level is low. However, as the income
increases, the eﬀect becomes very small and the pattern even becomes slightly reversed. This
may imply that the rich are not better oﬀ by purchasing an additional private annuity.
We analyze our results with various levels ofthe CRRA; as expected, the results indicate
that the AEW increases as the CRRA increases (Table 7). In other words, people with high risk
averseness would value the KNP higher than those with low risk averseness. Even though the
eﬀect ofthe CRRAs is clear and consistent, the magnitude ofthe e ﬀect seems to be small and
it may be due to the structure ofthe KNP
21.
Finally, we analyze the eﬀect ofthe minimum annual consumption requirement. The
results in Table 8 show that the AEW increases ifcouples are assumed to spend at least the
minimum consumption level, which is 8,000 USD annually. We investigate the eﬀect ofthis
requirement because it may be unrealistic that people spend a lot at the beginning oftheir
retirement but consume so small at the later part oftheir lif e. With this requirement, in the
model couples should maintain at least the minimum consumption level annually, which
represents a more realistic situation in real world. The results also show that those whose non-
pension asset levels are at the 25th and 30th percentiles and whose incomes are lower cannot
maintain the minimum annual consumption level with their disposable wealth (Table 8). This
last observation may be inevitable for those who do not have more savings at the time of
retirement. However, policymakers should keep this in mind when they improve the KNP in
near future.
V. Conclusions
By incorporating the bequest motives that are found to be relatively strong for Korean
retirees and couples as units ofanalysis, this study extends and improves the annuity valuation
model used in previous studies. To the best ofour knowledge, using both ﬁnancial and utility-
based measures with bequest motives, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide empirical evidence ofthe
redistribution eﬀect ofthe KNP f or couples. For this study, the educational level is used as a
proxy for mortality to classify the population in Korea. A ﬁnancial measurement, the MWR,
and a utility-based measurement, the AEW, are utilized to evaluate the value ofthe KNP with
various parameters and assumptions. Even though each ofthe measurements has its own
characteristics, the AEW seems to provide a more comprehensive evaluation ofthe KNP
because it takes into consideration couplesʼ socioeconomic conditions such as the non-pension
asset level, pre-existing private annuities, bequest motivation, etc.
This paper presents new evidence on the valuation and the extent ofredistribution ofthe
KNP. First, both the MWR and AEW analyses show strong progressive redistribution
depending on the income level. Even though it is diﬃcult to compare these two measurements
directly, we can discern that the magnitude ofthe e ﬀect is much bigger with the MWR than
with the AEW. Also, the result ofthe AEW analysis implies that a strong progressive
redistribution eﬀect is found in relation to the non-pension asset level. However, even though
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21 Table 1 in Brown and Poterba (2000) also indicates that their so-called REAL ANNUITIES where they assume
zero inﬂation rates like us have small impact ofdi ﬀerent CRRAs on the AEW.the results from the MWR analysis show strong regressive redistribution with respect to the
educational level, the AEW analysis indicates no signiﬁcant eﬀect ofredistribution with regard
to the educational level. It indicates that the regressive distribution eﬀect may not be as strong
as we estimate based on the ﬁnancial measurement; further, this ﬁnding is consistent with that
in Brown (2003).
Second, in general, the KNP is extremely valuable in terms ofboth ﬁnancial and utility-
based measurements except for the people with very high income and a very strong bequest
motive. Third, as the intensity ofbequest motivation increases, the value ofthe KNP decreases
and its eﬀect is a clear and consistent. However, the magnitude ofthe e ﬀect may not be as
large as that ofincome or non-pension asset. Fourth, pre-existing private annuities seem to
enhance the value ofthe KNP and this pattern is more evident when the income level is low.
Finally, ifcouples are assumed to spend at least the minimum annual consumption level, then
the value ofthe KNP actually increases. Also, some low-income groups with low levels ofnon-
pension assets (e.g., corresponding to the 25th or 30th percentile or less) and low income levels
cannot meet the requirement with their disposable wealth.
The results ofthis study provide usef ul and speci ﬁc insights for policymakers to re-design
or improve the KNP scheme and policy formula. First, the progressive redistribution from the
rich to the poor and from the more educated to the less educated should be encouraged to
accomplish the progressivity ofthe KNP scheme. Regarding this matter, we may recommend
that the KNP include heterogeneity in mortality by group with regard to, for instance, the
educational level or other levels ofwealth in the pension bene ﬁt formula. On the other hand,
we may suggest a simpler solution. Observe in Table 6 that in reality most ofpopulation may
be located on diagonal cells ofthe table where a high educational level means high income and
a low educational level means low income due to a positive correlation between income and
educational attainment. Also in Table 6, the values on the diagonal cells show strong
progressive redistribution with respect to income especially for the case with low non-pension
asset. Then, it may be true that the current progressive redistribution policy ofthe KNP based
solely on income level is indeed a solid solution to help the poor and disadvantaged have better
retirement. Second, in order to augment the value ofthe KNP bene ﬁt, other pensions such as a
private pension or a corporate pension are strongly recommended for couples with low earnings
potential. Third, some policy attention must be given to the people who cannot maintain the
minimum consumption level especially during later part oftheir lif e. Ultimately, it would be
necessary to design policies which help poor people maintain at least minimum consumption
level and prevent these people from experiencing retirement ruin.
APPENDIX A. Description of the Life-cycle Optimization Model Used in the Simulations
We begin by formally describing an optimization model for an individual in the case of bequests.












t   (A-1)
Subject to
W0 given (A-2)
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Wt+1=(Wt,Ct+At)(1+r), for t=0, 1,..., T,age+1 (A-4)
CtBCmin, for t=0, 1,..., T,age+1 (A-5)
DtCWt, for t=0, 1,..., T,age+1. (A-6)
In the above, qt is the probability ofdying during period t, time 0 is the time ofretirement, and age is the
retirement age. Also, Wt is the non-pension and non-annuitized wealth in period t, Ct is the annual
consumption in period t,a n dAt is the pension payment in period t. Cmin is the minimum level ofannual
consumption and r is the utility discount rate. The one-period utility function, U(Ct) (or U(Dt)), is utilized
as the objective function in the model; U(Ct) is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly






where b is the CRRA (constant relative risk aversion). Greater is the CRRA, greater is the risk aversion.
First ofall, the objective f unction, (A-1), is a summation ofthe expected-utility values over the
planning horizon, viz., the duration ofretirement. For each period, r is applied to ensure a relevant
discount on the utility value for that period. The annual consumption, Ct in period t, is a decision variable
in the model and is determined for each period. The constraint, (A-2), implies that the net wealth at the
time ofretirement is ﬁxed as some constant. Constraints (A-3) mean that wealth cannot be negative at any
point over the planning horizon. This kind ofconstraint also can be f ound in other research (Brown 2001;
2003; Brown and Poterba, 2000; Gong and Webb, 2008; Gupta and Li, 2007). The constraints, (A-4),
imply that any positive wealth is invested in risk-free assets. Finally, the restrictions, (A-5), require that
the minimum consumption level should be maintained in order to support a basic standard ofliving in
each period. Without the constraints, unreasonably small annual consumption levels were obtained,
especially towards the end ofthe lif etime.
Note that the parameter, b, controls the intensity ofthe bequest motive and is set to 0 when there is
no bequest motive (Cocco et al., 2005). Also, Dt is the amount ofbequests at the time ofdeath, viz.,
period t.
When we consider a couple instead ofan individual, we must use a di ﬀerent objective function in the
optimization model. For that purpose, we follow the model used in Brown and Poterba (2000). Following















where l is the degree ofjointness or complementarity ofconsumption and j is the parameter for





t are the annual consumption by a husband and wife in period t, respectively.
APPENDIX B. Description of the DP Solution Procedure Used in the Simulations
Since we consider the case of a couple, we need a separate value function for the male and female.
Each value function can be expressed as a recursively-deﬁned Bellman equation (Brown, 2003). For a




























































subject to constraints (A-2), (A-3), (A-4), (A-5), and (A-6).
Here, qt+1 is the one-period mortality probability, i.e., the probability ofthe individual ʼs dying in
period t+1 conditional upon his/her surviving through period t. The superscriptions m and f indicates a
husband (male) and wife (female), respectively.
Through the above Bellman equation, a complete, multi-period optimization problem can be
transformed into a series of simple, two-period, optimization problems, which can be solved numerically
by solving a two-period problem in the backward sequence from the ﬁnal period.
In order to solve a series oftwo-period optimization problems, we assume a discrete Wt space and
solve each problem numerically. Also, a stage is a period (e.g., period t) and a state is one value from
among the discretized Wt ʼs.
APPENDIX C. Sensitivity Analysis on Degree of Jointness and Survivor Ratio
We perf orm sensitivity analysis on degree ofjointness and survivor ratio analysis. First ofall, the
results with diﬀerent degrees ofjointness values are presented in Table A-1. Note that the CRRA is set to
2 because the AEW does not changes when CRRA = 1 (Brown and Poterba, 2000). In general, the
degree ofjointness has small impact on the AEWs. The AEW values are slightly decreases as l increases
from 0 to 1.
The results ofthe AEW with di ﬀerent survivor ratios are presented in Table A-2. The AEW values
are slightly decreased as the survivor ratio increases. It implies that increase ofthe survivor ratio actually
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1.1462






70 1.0992 1.0844 1.0640







1.1388 1.2213 1.3187 30
1.0163 1.0132 1.0047 90
1.0987




1.1021 1.1537 1.1977 50
1.0675 1.0886 1.1038 70
1.0204 1.0180 1.0093 90
1.1089 70
1.0251 1.0229 1.0137 90
1.2152 1.4008 1.7384 10
λ＝0.5
1.1421 1.2258 1.3243
1.0717 1.0929decreases the annuity money from pre-existing private annuity and in turn, it decreases value of the AEW.
Note that survivor ratio is only applicable to pre-existing private annuity because in case ofthe KNP,
survivor ratio is speciﬁcally set in the pension beneﬁt formulae.
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